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STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE 
RICHARD A. CHAPMAN 
Most liberal democracies, especially countries in the commonwealth with 
British traditions, are proud of their high standards in public life. Their systems 
of government have been developed with considerable care. Citizens in general 
have high expectations of their politicians and officials, and their expectations 
have usually been met. The occasional cause celebre has had a salutory 
educational affect in terms of drawing attention to dangers to be avoided, often 
in leading to the introduction of new procedures or safeguards, and also a 
contributory factor in the education of citizens about their systems of 
government, through focusing attention on what standards to expect and what 
to condemn. 
Leading politicians, officials and writers have contributed to this reputation 
by emphasising the high standards achieved and expected. For example, in 
his 1993 evidence to the United Kingdom's Treasury and Civil Service Select 
Committee, Lord Callaghan said of the British civil service the 'It really is a 
bulwark of the constitution. One only has to go to any other country and to 
see what happens when the Civil Service is not a bulwark, when it does not 
have the traditions of our Civil Service';! and Laby Thatcher in her book The 
Downing Street Years, sa 'The sheer professionalism of the British Civil Service, 
which allows governments to come and go with a minimum of dislocation and 
a maximum of efficiency, is something other countries with different systems 
have every cause to envy'. 2 
These high standards were advanced by a number of conventions, processes 
and procedures that were developed over long periods of time and that became 
particularly important in the context of the so-called unwritten features of a 
constitution. Also carefully designing the machinery of government, by 
statements made of the purposes of our insitutions and, in more recent times, 
by codes of practice. But perhaps most important of all, they have arisen from 
a complex amalgam which social scientists often refer to as socialisation. In 
this context this refers to the impact of a variable con:tbination of education, 
unstructured learning, observation, and experience of life. People know what 
they ought to do, and what should be expected of others, from this important 
combination, and from their own reflections about it. A good example of this 
in practice, using terminology which reflected his own classical education, is 
the statement made by Sir William Armstrong in 1969, when, as Head of the 
Civil Service, he was being questioned on television about his personal attitude 
so 
to exercising the considerable power he had. He explained that for him, being 
accountable to oneself was the greatest taskmaster He added: I am accountable 
to my own ideal of a civil servant'. 3 
The position from which this lecture begins is therefore that high standards 
have been expected in public life, and to a considerable degree those standards 
have been achieved - or, at least, there is a widespread belief that they were 
being achieved. Politicians and civil servants, as individuals or as groups, may 
not have been noticeably popular, and they may have been good subjects for 
caricature; but they have been largely trusted, thought to have been decent, 
and motivated in the direction of the public interest rather than satisfying their 
personal or private interests. When compared with other countries, our own 
experience of standards in public life has usually been reflected in feelings of 
relief, gratitude for our apparent good fortune, and a belief that, on balance, 
we are not really being badly served. 
In recent years, however, the position has changed. There is less reason 
for contentment and no reason for complacency. People look back on the events 
of nearly thirty-five years ago, recall that, in the United Kingdom, John Profumo 
resigned from the Government and Parliament because he was found to have 
lied to Parliament, and they reflect that his action in resigning would not be 
easily found in similar circumstances today. MPs have been exposed for 
accepting money to ask questions in the House of Commons, but they have 
not resigned their seats. There appears to have been an increase in the number 
of cases of officials found guilty of corruption. There have been numerous 
examples of standards being lowered in the provision of services, and in the 
ways of assessing and measuring services. The idea of upholding public service 
above private or sectional interests is no longer a revered feature of public life. 
Indeed, as Fergus Allen, formerly a First Civil Service Commissioner, recently 
put it: 'Impartial public service is a concept to be praised from the platform 
but laughed at in the cocktail bar'. 4 It is, perhaps, an important sign of the 
times. As a result there have been two significant institutional developments 
confirming that all is not well.A standing Commission, under Lord Nolan, has 
been created to consider and make recommendations about standards in public 
life, s and there has been an unprecedented major public inquiry by Sir Richard 
Scott into the export of defence equipment and dual use goods to Iraq. 6 This 
inquiry, in particular, reealed contemporary details of the way government 
works so that any responsible citizen is now likely to be very anxious about 
current and future standards in public life. 
For the purposes of this lecture it should be emphasised that the Scott 
Report has made available more detail about the working of government 
than any previous public inquiry. Other inquiries, even those set up 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) 
Act, have not been so revealing, nor have they presented so many 
judgments and considered comments on administrative practice. 7 However, 
the starting point as far as the Scott Report is concerned, will not be 
the purpose of the Scott Inquiry but its unprecedented revelations about 
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standards in public life, including aspects of ministerial responsibility and the 
abuse of power. This will be followed by comments on the machinery of 
government, and ethics in the practice of government. The tecture will end 
with some personal comments and reflections. 
In the final paragraph of volume one of his Report, Scott, summarising 
the Government's attituGc to policy on defence exports to Iraq, says that 
statements made in 1989 and 1990 'consistently ... failed to discharge the 
obligations imposed by the constitutional principle of ministerial 
accountability'B. His Report is peppered throughout with observations about 
ministers and civil servants failing to comply with these obligations, and 
although at first sight the Scott Report appears to have drawn attention to 
weaknesses in the practice of the key doctrine of ministerial responsibility, there 
is a sense in which the report in fact re-emphasises its importance. Throughout 
the report there are numerous examples of the ways the behaviour of officials 
is conditioned by this doctrine. The evidence makes it absolutely clear that 
the doctrine - which requires ministers to be responsible for all actions carried 
in their name by their officials - is still of fundamental importance in the Bdtish 
system of government. Of course, any student of public policy knows that it 
is a doctrine of much more significance than the more sensational press reports 
suggest: popular newspapers somtimes find it easy to state its lack of practical 
relevance, citing the apparent absence of ministerial resignations as evidence. 
Students of public policy, and discerning citizens, know that there is much more 
to the doctrine than the press and other media commentators might have us 
believe. In practice, this doctrine, or constitutional convention, permeates the 
daily decision making processes in all government departments. This is always 
evident where officials have to be aware of the politically sensitive implications 
of any decision they may make. even where it is an apparently routine nature. 
In recent years the doctrine of ministerial responsibility has been 
undermined by politicians. There have been occasions when ministers have 
not been prepared to accept public responsibility for the consequences of 
decisions they approved or that were made in their name. An outstanding 
example of this- in my opinion a watershed in the history of ministerial 
accountability -was in 1972 when Mr John Davies, as Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, told civil servants who had been criticised by the Vehicle 
and General Inquiry, that they could speak publicly in defence of their position 
if, as he put it, 'they considered that it was in their best interest to do so'. 9 
This was contrary to any reasonable expectation of ministerial reponsibility 
and, indeed, could have led to his officials becoming public figures and the 
redundancy of ministers, but Davies's statement was not even challenged by 
the Opposition in the House of Commons. A second example occured in 1985. 
In oral evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, Mr Alistair 
Graham, then General Secret.ary of the Civil and Public Services Association, 
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was being questioned about the duties and resposibilities of civil servants and 
ministers. When he was being pressed strongly by Mr Ralph Howell MP, 
Graham replied by asking Howell what he thought a civil servant should do 
if he was being asked to play a role in misleading, or publicly lying to, 
Parliament. Howell replied: 'Since that has been happening ever since 
Parliament has been, I cannot see what you are getting fussed about'. 10 It 
seemed extraordinary that an MP should make such a statement in public, but 
it was even more extraordinary that the statement did not receive a rebuke 
or comment from the Committee Chairman or any other MP present. The 
serious implication was that they accepted the statement as accurate in reference 
to the conduct of ministers. 
The Seott Report reveals more examples, both about the willingness of 
ministers to circumvent the requirements of ministerial responsibility and more 
widerly about the decline in constitutional propriety of the relationships between 
ministers and civil servants. They reveal that civil servants are equally CUlpable 
as their political masters for this decline. Three examples illustrate this. 
One of the Ministers of Defence in 1985 was Mr (now Sir) Adam Butler, 
and he made it clear to his civil servants, on more than one occasion, that he 
wanted to be kept informed about decisions of Interdepartmental Committee 
on licensing experts to Iran and Iraq, so that he could pursue matters himself 
if he wished. In particular he wanted to see details of license approvals before 
the information was passed to the Department of Trade and Industry or t6 the 
companies concerned. His civil servants, however, effectively prevented this 
by presenting the information so late that, as Seott put it, 'The Minister was 
being presented with a fait accompli'. 11 Seott later added: 'I do not understand 
how Mr Dawson (a civil Servant) could have thought it right to dispense with 
Mr Butler's approval of the propsed procedures.' 12 The Minister, it seemed 
to Seott, was not aware until some time later that he had been effectively denied 
the opportunity of challenging the Interdepartmental Committee's decisions, 
and as soon as he became aware, he h~d the position remedied. The fact remains, 
however, that civil servants were expressly ignoring the Minister's instructions 
and gave him no time to intervene in decisions before they were announced. 
The reason for this surprising disregard of the authority of, and accountability 
to ministers, was that civil servants were placing greater emphasis on increasing 
defence sales than they were on carrying out the minister's instructions and 
getting ministerial approval of licensing decisions. Civil servants also seemed 
to be adopting a cavalier attitude to the requirement for consultation. There 
is, in practice, so much difference between consulting, on the one hand, and 
presenting information, on the other, that failure to actually consult the minister 
resulted in an unauthorised change in the power base for desision making from 
ministers to officials. 13 
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A second revelation in the Scott Reports concerns the abuse of power by 
successive governments from the end of the Second World war until December 
1990, in the using of emergency powers, intended only for the duration of the 
emergency, contained in the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) 
Act, 1939. This resulted in contorols over exports for reaasons of administrative 
convenience and political expediency by the 'convenient fiction' that the wartime 
emergency was continuing. Officials and politicians, Scott discovered, were 
aware that this was a misuse of power but nevertheless continued to make 
decisions on that basis. Scott made his reaction perfectly clear by saying that 
this was 'a continuing abuse of power'. 14 
Sadly, it is appropriate to recall that at least one other example coulh be 
given of using powers intended by Parliament for one purpose, for a qUlte 
different purpose. When the Civil Service Department was created in 1968 it 
was established not by an Act of Parliament but by an Order in Council. 15 'The 
Minister for the Civil Service Order' (No 1656), was promulgated in pursuance 
of the Ministers of the Crown (Transfers of Functions) Act 1946. However, that 
Act was intended to rationalise functions between departments in post-war 
conditions, and Parliament was specifically told at the time that it could not 
be used to set up a new ministry. 16 Of course, ministers and officials could 
have argued that it was in accordence with acient precedent to regulate the 
Civil Service of the Crown by Orders in Council, and the effect was the same 
whatever the ultimate basis of authority was. However, the fact remains that 
a new ministry was set up by a procedure of very debious propriety. 
These examples should be enough to indicate that, in terms of constitutional 
conventions and formal organistion theory alone, standards have been by no 
means as high as is popularly thought. Any examples of setting aside ministerial 
responsibility, and the abuse of power for administrative convenience or political 
expediency, are extremely worrying in a system of government which is 
popUlarly thought to be above such tactics. Indeed, the examples seem more 
likely to have come from a developing country with little experience of 
constitutional government or liberal democracy than from the United Kingdom, 
with its long respected traditions of high standards in the practice of goverment. 
Nevertheless, the details presented here are soundly based on incontrovertible 
evidence. Anxieties are even more serious when the present British 
Government's plans for future of its recruitment agency; recruitment and 
Assessment services, are considered as an example of changes in the machinery 
of government. 
Recruitment and Assessment services (RAS) was created as an exceutive 
agency of government in 1991. Its primary aim was 'to be the most cost-effective 
centre of excellence in the recruitment and selection services working in the 
public sector'. 17 As an executive agency, it was an example of implementing 
the proposals in the Next Steps Report of 1988. 18 That report made 
54 
recommendations for delivering government services more efficiently and 
effectively within available resources, for the benefit of taxpayers, customers 
and staff. In particular, it said that government activities were too big to be 
managed as one unit, and freestanding agencies should be created to carry out 
specific activities. In 1991 the Government therefore abolished the Civil Service 
Commission, replacing it with RAS and a small office, known as the Office of 
the Civil Service Commissioners. The Commissioners continued, but with 
reduced resposibilities, and much of the continuing operational work of 
advertising vacancies, and running the selection co~petitions for recruiting staff 
became functions of the new RAS agency. 
This work had a long and distinguished history. In the nineteenth century 
there was considerable public concern about the inefficiency of government 
departments and the problems caused by patronage as a survival of aristocratic 
priviledge. This led to a number of inquiries into the work of individual 
government departments and, later, to what ammounted to a concluding report 
by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyn. In their famous report, 
published in 1854, two of the most important proposals were that open 
competitive examinations should replace patronage, and that the examinations 
should be conducted by an independent body of examiners. 19 These duties 
became the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission, first set up in 1855 
on an experimental basis, but confirmed on a more effective and permanent 
basis, from 1870. It became a requirement that anyone appointed to a permanent 
position in the civil service should have a certificate of qualification from the 
Commissioners. 
The system of selection by open competition proved to be very effective, 
was highly regarded and copied by other countries. After the Second World 
War the Commission developed the selection of graduate entrants through a 
specially created and subsequently world famous Civil Service Selection 
Board. 20 All of this was done by the Commissioners and their staff to high 
standards and with great distinction. The result was that the Civil Service 
Commission and its Civil Service Selection Board became, in the recent words 
of Lord Bancroft, a former Head of the Civil Service, 'the envy of the world', 
and 'open competition supervised by an independent body itself protected 
against interference from any quarter, has been the bedrock of Civil Service 
standards for more than a century'. 21 
Since 1991 RAS, as an agency of government, has had to compete with 
commercial organisation for contracts from departments to select their staff. 
This was because devolution of recruitment to departments meant that over 
3,000 recruitment units had been created, and for many categories of jobs RAS 
had no protected right to run the recruitment schemes. Some departments did 
their own, others contracted out the work, or parts of it, to firms of consultants. 
The Commissioners were still responsible for monitoring recruitment according 
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to the principles laid down by the minister for fair and open competition, and 
they have been doing this in what has been referred to as 'light-handed, 
economical and systems-based manner'.22 RAS meanwhile developed a 
consultancy service to advise departments on their devolved resposibilities, 
using the considerable expertise and experience it had of public service 
reruitment. 
On 23 November 1995, by an arranged question in the House of Commons 
- and in terms of channels for the announcement of a public policy you can't 
get much lower than that - to which the Government responded with a written 
answer, it was revealed that the Government intended to sell RAS. Later, on 
25 January 1996, Earl Howe explained in the House of Lords that the 
Government's policy on this issue began 'from the premise that the 
administration of a recruitment service ... is not a task which needs to be 
undertaken by government'. 23 It was also announced that till the service was 
privatized staff would, in principle, be able to apply for other posts advertised 
within the civil service, subject to the agreement of line management that they 
could be released. However, a news release from the Office of Public Service 
has recognised that, in practice, staff might find it difficult to secure this 
agreement, because in order to maintain the viability, and presumably achieve 
the saleability of RAS, staff will have to be sold as one of its main assets. It 
therefore seems that most RAS staff will have no alternative to ending their 
public service careers. It remains to be seen what happens to this sale in the 
next two or three months, but whatever happens to RAS, the arrangements 
for recruiting civil servants have been made changed fundamentally in the last 
few years. Some attempts have been made to preserve the standards for which, 
in the past, the Civil Service Commission achieved such widespread recognition. 
In particular, the Commissioners issued a Recruitment Code in 1995;24 but 
whether this will be sufficient to maintain the high reputation of civil service 
recruitment will only be evident after many more yea.rs (i.e. when new recruits 
have had the chance to achieve the most senior positions in departments). 
The reason for focusing on the recent history and the proposed sale of RAS 
is that it indicates the importance of machinery of government arrangements 
for ensuring high standards in public service. Already there is no central office 
with overall responsibility for advertising, processing applications, selecting 
candidates and allocating them to departments. Most of this work is now done 
by departments themselves. However well drafted the recruitment Code may 
have been, it is unlikely to ensure that the previous standards are applied in 
so many devolved units, and there is already a considerable amount of anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that the efficiency of recruitment procedures is no longer 
as good as it was, and good gradutes are being discouraged from applying for 
some of the most important competitions. Moreover, it is very difficult to explain 
to freinds and colleagues, especially in other countries, why the Civil Service 
Commission, previously so widely admired, has now been abolished and RAS 
is being sold. 
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The issues associated with the Civil Service Commission and RAS are more 
important then other topics in the machinery of governmet. This is bacause 
the recruitment processes, for which they were responsible, played such a major 
role in eliminating patronage and improving the overall efficiency of 
government departments Their greatly admired achievements were, in fact, 
to recruit people both of merit and who were motivated to public service. There 
can be no guarantees that a commercial organisation, recruiting civil servants 
on a contract basis, and as only part of its activities, will be able to perform 
a comparable service-however good the Recruitment Code is that guides the 
work and however effective the light-handed monitoring procedure may be. 
Many other examples could also be given of the importance of high 
standards when designing or re-structuring government departments and their 
associated procedures. For example, at the present time questions are being 
asked in the United Kingdom about the possible conflicts of interest in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, when dealing with the problems 
associated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (i.e. mad cow disease). Can 
such a ministry be properly effective when looking after both food hygiene 
interests and farming interests? What structures are best suited to resolving 
conflicts between governments departments in matters like the exporting of 
defence equipment and dual use goods, especially where, as in the case of Iraq, 
three government departments were involved with interests that were by no 
means the same? In relation to these and similar questions it is important to 
have clear understandings of what the purposes of particular organisations are 
how their purposes may be best achieved. These are as much matters for the 
attention of students of public policy and for responsible citizens as any more 
salacious aspects of the behaviour of particular individuals in public life, though 
those elements also have important parts to play in the widest approach to this 
topic. 
The third area of the subject to be briefly considered in this lecture is ethics 
in the practice of governments; but as time is limited, two examples only will 
be introduced. Ethics in governments is such a very broad topic that these 
examples can do no more than indicate the sorts of themes worth pursuing 
further. The two examples are first, lying, including being economical with 
the truth; and secondly, openness and embarrassment. 
First, as far as the acceptability of lying is concerned, much depends on 
such factors as the values of society, including some of the most important 
principles of the systems of government, and the interests being held in the 
balance when a decision has to be made about the over-riding interest or goal 
to be pursued, and other interests to be subordinated. There is a significant 
literature on this suhject. including the major works on lying and secrets by 
Sissela Bok,25 but there is no time even to mention the many themes that 
should be explored. However, one of the matters examined so well by Bok is 
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the relationship between lying and the duty felt by individuals to protect their 
secrets, and it is this link which will be considered here because the two themes 
come together so well and so provocatively in the evidence to the Scott inquiry. 
Lying was significant in the controversy over exporting arms to Iraq because 
of its political perspectives. Again and again in the Scott report politicians and 
officials were making decisions for reasons other than the reasons they were 
stating. In the 1980s the United Kingdom Government was trying to maximise 
its sales of arms but at the same time presenting itself not only as not assisting 
Iran or Iraq in their hostilities, it was also claiming to adopt an even-handed 
and impartial approach to the two countries. This led to the development of 
guidelines for deciding export licence applications. The quideliness were 
carefully drafted, and the key criterion, on which licence applications were 
considered, was whether new orders for any defence equipment would 
'significantly enhance' 26the capacity of either side to prolong or exacerbate the 
conflict. These guidelines, and in particular the key criterion that is, significant 
enhancement, as the former minister Mr Alan Clark explained, an ideal 
Whitehall formula. He said the guidelins were: 
'imprecise, open to argument in almost every instance, guaranteed to generate 
dabate, if not dispute between different Departments (thus generating much paper, 
sub-committees and general bureaucratic self-justification). They were high-
sounding, combining it seemed both moral and practical considerations, and yet 
imprecise enough to allow real policy an override in exceptional circumstances.' 27 
These policy guidelines had the quite extraordinary result of allowing policy 
to change, though interepretation and flexible implementation, while ministers 
claimed that it had not changed. From the perspective of this present discussion 
it is not the guidelines or their interpretation that will be considered but the 
complex reasoning and attitude of politicians and officials to the democratic 
environment. It may be argued by people expecting integrity in public life that 
if we are prepared to sell arms to anyone who wants to buy them, including 
tyrants, we should be prepared to say so and defend the policy. The alternative, 
involving an elaborate pretence, seems intended to convince, or keep in the 
dark, gullible or ill-informed citizens, though it may never convince people with 
insider experience, or who have studied pubic policy. 
What is so serious about this is that it is contrary to parliamentary 
expectations and offensive to citizens. As Scott has reported, the obligation to 
be forthcoming with information in answer to Parliamentary Questions lies 
at the heart of the constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility.28 
Instead, what was revealed to the inquiry was that the Government's policy 
was being concealed, as Scott put it, 'from Parliament and the public, while 
at the same time repeatedly professing a defence sales policy that was impartial 
and even-handed'. 29 
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This conveniently leads on to comments about openness and secrecy. The 
Scott Report sheds new and unattractive light on this. As with other topics 
touched on all too briefly in this lecture, there is a large and well established 
literature on openness and secrecy.30 Much of it is highly responsible - for 
example, in drawing attention in a democracy to the need for openness in order 
to hold a government fully accountable for its actions, and to assess the validity 
of actions taken; but at the same time recognising that there are occasions when 
confidentiality and secrecy have to be respected in the public interest or in 
the private interest of individual citizens. No where, as far as I know, is there 
a proper defence of secrecy on two of the grounds found by Scott to have been 
applied in practice. 'One of these was embarrassment: the evidence indicated 
that Public Interest' Immunity certificates were being signed by ministers to 
suppress and keep from disclosure documents which, if disclosed, would be 
an embarrassment to the Government. 31 The other is the attitude to publicity 
revealed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Assistant Head of the 
Feo Middle East Department wrote that ' ... if it becomes public knowledge 
that the tools are to be used to make munitions, deliveries will have to stop 
at once', and that the companies 'must renounce publicity and lobbying for their 
own good'. Scott interpreted this as accepting 'that public pressure may cause 
the reversal of an administrative decision (presumbly a decision believed to 
be a correct one) and implicity, that possibility is a good reason for knowldge 
being withheld from the public'. 32 The implications of this were made even 
clearer, when Mr Barrett, a Ministry of Defence official, said 'the public would 
not understand', 33 and when Lord Howe agreed at the Scott inquiry that it 
was a 'Government knows best approach'. 34 
This sheds new light on a phenomenon widely mentioned in studies of 
public policy making. One of the most sesitive constraints on civil servants in 
a liberal democracy is 'embarrassment' - which it is thought necessary to avoid 
at all costs. Anthony Sampson explains embarrassment as a word which 
signalises the dreaded intrusion of the outside world.35 In most cases this may, 
in the past, have been thought of as no more than inconvenience and additional 
expense when the administrator's carefully considered policy, conscientiously 
made in the publi(:: interest, is interrupted for reasons that official minds believe 
to be ill-informed or misguided. In other cases this may, in the past, have related 
to policy matters becoming sensitive in the context of partism controversy; and 
to officals loyal to whatever government they are currently serving, this, too, 
is inconvenient. Nowhere, as far as I know, has it ever before been related to 
concealing a policy from Parliament and the public because actual policy was 
contrary to the publicly professed policy of defence sales on a basis of 
impartiality and even-handedness.36 Information about this was in fact 
legitimately requested through the normal parliamentary procedures but Scott 
found that it was being denied for the spurious reason of commercial 
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confidentiality, when it could easily have been provided without breeching any 
such confidentiality.37 This was a serious denial of what Scott corrently referred 
to as 'the right of Parliament and the public to be informed of and to require 
Ministers to account publicly for the manner in which public money is being 
utilised'. 38 
After this survey of some of the key issues raised, by the Scott Report and 
elsewhere, about standards in public life, it is now time for some personal 
comments and reflections. 
For most of my life I have been a student of politics and, in particular, 
of public policy making with special reference to the United Kingdom. After 
some initial scepticism. I acquired a considerable respect for the politicans and 
civil servants I studied. Some of this respect was inspired by my teacher and 
friend Professor Bruce Miller, whose inaugural lecture was in praise of studying 
politicians. Miller noted that there was 
'an incurable human tendency to blame somebody for the unpleasent things in 
life; and since politicians always claim credit for any good which occurs, it is 
reasonable that they should take the blame for the bad. It is also true that they 
sometimes tell lies and mislead the public ... (but, he said) I think we should take 
more account than we do of the indispensable functions which the politician 
performs in a free political culture. If we want a free political system, we cannot 
do without him'. 39 
Comparable comments may be offered about civil servents. They, too, are 
necessary in a liberal democracy; and, though they can sometimes be infuriating 
and dilatory, and may also have other defects of bureaucrats, studies of past 
officials, especially in the United Kingdom, have generally shown them to be 
able, well-motivated, decent men and women, whose primary concern was to 
serve the public interest, through the administration of the policies of, or 
approved by, elected representatives. As individuals and as a group many of 
them have contributed to a tradition and ethos of public service; they have 
chosen an honourable profession of public service and done their best. Many 
civil servants and politicians are sti1llike that, but there have been major changes 
in recent years. The private interests of officials have been stimulated by 
personnel policies that encourage performance related pay, with performance 
indicators that assess merit and reward achievement according to varieties of, 
often inadequately considered, measurable criteria. It is considered a virtue to 
be productive in these conditions, and people who are thought to be business-
like and appear to get things done are rewarded with rapid advancement and 
the sort of salaries thought to be appropriate in a business-admired world. 
Sometimes, it seems, this undermines their traditional professional standards 
because, in order to advance their interests, it becomes expedient to give advice 
according to what they think ministers want to hear. 
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In the past there were safeguards, thought generally to be effective (though 
who knows how effective they were without a Scott Inquiry to investigate 
them?), and belived to be crucial in a country without the advantages of a written 
constitution. These safeguards were built up piecemeal and over many years. 
They included formal and hierarchical accountability within formal organisation 
structures, together with ultimate accountability to ministers, and ministerial 
accountability to Parliament; institutional provisions for fair and open 
recruitment of officials according to known standards by a respected 
independent body; legal safeguards to ensure that powers were exercised in 
accordance with the law by legitimate officials on behalf of ministers; and 
expectations that public policies should be fairly administered with as much 
openness as possible in the interests of democratic government. 
Some of these safguards are being abolished or are now considered to be 
redundant in the context of new approaches to public sector management. 
Therefore new safeguards are being introduced - in the United Kingdom there 
are now numerous customer service charters and codes of conduct for ministers 
and public servants. New commissioners have been created for administration, 
and for Parliament. There is the hope that, without a written constitution and 
a bill of rights, the gaps will be filled and everthing will be all right. 
This, however, is never likely to be completely satisfactory. It is not possible 
to legislate for trust; and laws and codes to protect the rights of individual do 
not always operate satisfactory -as the evidence in totalitarian regimes proves. 
Indeed, as Ellen Wilkinson, the MP for Jarrow, wrote many years ago, 'Nothing 
is so dangerous in a demacracy as a safeguard which appears to be adaquate 
but is really a facade'. 40 
The best safeguard for high standards in public life must be concientious 
and responsible citizenship. It is only through a combination of active 
participation in citizenship, and education, including education about 
government and politics, as well as through good institutions, responsible 
procedures, and the widespread expectation of and agitation for high standards, 
that those high standards will be achieved and maintained in public life. It is 
not a responsibility of others, but of us all. 
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